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Cloud Computing, Contractibility, and Network Architecture
Christopher S. Yoo*
ABSTRACT
The emergence of the cloud is heightening the demands on the network in
terms of bandwidth, ubiquity, reliability, latency, and route control.
Unfortunately, the current architecture was not designed to offer full support for
all of these services or to permit money to flow through it. Instead of modifying
or adding specific services, the architecture could redesigned to make Internet
services contractible by making the relevant information associated with these
services both observable and verifiable. Indeed, several on-going research
programs are exploring such strategies, including the NSF’s NEBULA,
eXpressive Internet Architecture (XIA), ChoiceNet, and the IEEE’s Intercloud
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INTRODUCTION
One of the fundamental changes effected by the emergence of cloud computing is to take
functions previously performed by resources contained within a user’s personal computer or
laptop and transfer them to servers located in a distant data center. For users running virtual
desktops, every single keystroke must pass through the network and be remotely registered by a
virtual machine.
Such a drastic rearrangement of where particular tasks are performed creates pressure for
the architecture to evolve to meet these new demands. For example, the fact that data that
previously did not need to leave the personal computer sitting on the user’s desk must now pass
through a transmission network may lead to increased demand for bandwidth and decreased
tolerance for latency. Moreover, because the path over which the data may travel may not be
secure and the legal requirements of various jurisdictions may be diverse, cloud computing may
lead users to demand the ability to verify the source of a packet and to exercise a greater degree
of control over the path over which their data will travel and the locations where their data will
be hosted.
In short, the advent of cloud computing is placing new demands on the Internet and other
communications networks that users are employing to access cloud-based services and resources.
Unfortunately, the services that the Internet is designed to provide are rather limited in both
number and scope. Moreover, the types of services being provided over the cloud are constantly
changing. Any attempt to modify the Internet to incorporate a discrete set of new services risks
being rendered obsolete by the next wave of innovation.
Rather than try to restructure the network to provide a particular set of services needed by
the current iteration of the cloud, an alternative approach would seek to reengineer the
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architecture to provide the necessary primitives sufficient to enable present and future cloud
service providers to support a wide range of policies. If properly designed, these primitives
should allow both users and providers to create and monitor the services that they need by
contract. Basic principles of contract theory have revealed two prerequisites that must be
satisfied if contracts are to be effective. First, the information that is subject to the contract must
be observable, in that both parties can perceive the relevant states of the world with respect to
that information. Second, the relevant information must be verifiable, in that the parties must be
able to prove after the fact in a court of law or to some other third party that the relevant state of
the world did or did not occur (see, e.g., Hölmstrom 1979; Hart and Moore 1988). A classic
example of a matter that is observable but not verifiable is effort exercised by an employee in the
context of an employment contract. Both the employer and the employee may be well aware of
the employee’s level of effort or lack thereof, but it may be unable to be prove in a court of law.
If the architecture is to allow private actors to contract for certain levels of quality of
service or data security, the minimum information needed for parties to be able to enforce their
bargains must be observable and verifiable by the parties. The logical solution is to locate the
primitives to make Internet transactions contractible in the network layer, which is the spanning
layer visible to all network participants. The problem is that the Internet’s current architecture
does not satisfy either criterion. Users can observe or verify neither the source of data nor the
precise path that a given transmission will take through the network. Moreover, the network
layer of the Internet, which consists of the Internet Protocol (IP), is notoriously difficult to
change.
Ongoing research sponsored by the National Science Foundation (NSF) and the Institute
of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) is exploring ways to redesign the architecture to
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provide the primitives necessary to make the network services demanded by cloud computing
contractible. Such a revision would enable network providers and users to make their own
arrangements regarding new network services required by the cloud, which would be more
consistent with the Internet’s traditional approach of relying on decentralized decision making
and would preserve the flexibility to adapt to new developments and increases in scale.
I.

THE CLOUD’S NEED FOR NEW NETWORK SERVICES

As noted previously, cloud computing takes functions that used to involve the interaction
of physical resources connected directly to a personal computer or a laptop and distributes them
to a remote data center. This reconfiguration will place new demands on the access network in
terms of bandwidth, ubiquity, reliability, latency, and route control. The access networks’ ability
to meet these demands will go a long way toward determining cloud computing’s attractiveness
as an option.
A.

Bandwidth
Cloud computing is likely to increase the demands that are placed on the local access

network. As an initial matter, new cloud computing customers must have some means for
uploading their data to the data centers when setting up new applications. At this point, however,
the access network does not have sufficient bandwidth to support this level of utilization.
Because data sets in the terabyte range would take weeks to upload, cloud computing providers
currently recommend that customers download their data onto a physical storage medium and
send it via an overnight mail service (Brodkin 2010). Eventually, the hope is that network
capacity will increase to the point where large data sets can be provisioned through the network
itself.
4

Even after data has been provisioned to a new cloud computing facility, the fact that
processing that used to occur locally is now being performed in the data center typically means
that a greater volume of traffic must pass to and from the client that the user is operating. Cloud
computing may thus cause an increase in the total bandwidth required from the network on a
day-to-day basis as well.
B.

Ubiquity
Cloud computing requires a higher degree of ubiquity than traditional computing

solutions. When the software and the data needed to run a particular application reside on the
users’ hard disk, the unavailability of a network connection may inconvenience them and reduce
the application’s functionality, but it does not necessarily stop them from being productive in any
way. When the software and data reside in the cloud, however, the absence of a network
connection has more serious consequences, effectively preventing them from running the
application at all. As a result, cloud computing customers regard ubiquitous access to network
connections as critical.
C.

Reliability
A related concern is access network reliability. The availability of an access network

connection is meaningless if it is not functioning properly. Even when the application and the
data reside on a user’s hard disk, the failure of a network connection can severely limit the user’s
ability to perform productive work. Network failure becomes an even more serious obstacle
when these elements are hosted in the cloud. Indeed, Gmail, Salesforce.com, and Amazon’s
Simple Storage Service (S3) and Elastic Compute Cloud (EC2) have suffered from wellpublicized service outages that imposed severe difficulties on their customers. These higher
5

stakes mean that some customers are likely to demand that access networks offer higher levels of
guaranteed uptime.
D.

Quality of Service
Users’ willingness to offload services that used to be provided locally into the cloud

depends in no small part on how quickly the cloud is able to perform those functions. Aside from
bandwidth, the most frequently discussed aspect of quality of service is latency, which is the
delay that an application takes to register a change. Someone typing on a virtual desktop is likely
to insist on latencies that are no more than a few hundred milliseconds. Other relevant aspects of
quality of service include reliability (measured in terms of the accuracy of records) and jitter
(measured in terms of variations in the spacing between packets). Different applications have
different tolerances for each aspect of quality of service. As a result, cloud computing customers
are likely to insist on service level agreements (SLAs) that guarantee them certain minimum
levels of quality of service on those dimensions that matter most to them. These demands will
likely vary in different cases. For example, financial services companies typically require perfect
transactions, with latency guarantees measured in microseconds. In addition, these companies
require the cloud provider to audit the accuracy and delivery time of every transaction after the
fact.
Cloud computing is likely to require sophisticated network management techniques to
provide minimum levels of quality of service. One way that cloud computing systems can
improve the quality of service of network services is by taking advantage of the presence of
multiple connections between two points. The Internet currently relies on protocols such as the
Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) to determine the route that any particular stream of packets may
take between domains. BGP is limited in its ability to manage multiple paths, routing all traffic
6

along a single route instead of balancing traffic across multiple paths. BGP, moreover, is
controlled by the core routers rather than by users. A new architecture for cloud computing could
improve network performance by providing greater ability to allocate traffic across multiple
paths and to allow faster recovery from congestion and network failure. It could also increase
functionality by giving users control over the particular routes taken by their traffic.
E.

Control Over Routing
Cloud computing necessarily requires large amounts of data that previously did not leave

a company’s computer or internal network to be transported via a series of networks to a data
center. The fact that this data must pass outside the company’s firewall and through the access
network renders it vulnerable to attack vectors that are different from those that plague corporate
campuses.
As a result, cloud-based solutions must be able to assure these institutions that their data
are being handled in a way that preserves confidentiality by giving users greater ability to control
which networks their traffic passes through. Because cloud computing requires that sensitive
information must pass over a network connection, users may demand the ability to verify a
packet’s source, as well as the means to ensure that their data will pass only over networks they
deem trustworthy.
Moreover, the ability to shift data from one data center to another potentially makes that
data subject to another country’s privacy laws. Current data protection requirements vary widely
across jurisdictions. For example, US law holds all institutions that maintain health or
educational records responsible for maintaining their privacy. The fact that such records are now
housed in the cloud does not obviate those responsibilities. However, in the European Union, the
law requires that data be retained only for limited purposes and for limited times. Because
7

customers are ultimately responsible for any such violations, they are likely to insist on a
significant degree of control over where their data reside at any particular moment. In addition,
cloud computing may require an architecture that permits the exact routes that particular traffic
takes to be auditable and verifiable after the fact.
The emergence of the cloud is thus causing users to place a different set of demands on
the network. Moreover, not all cloud users will need the same combination of services. Word
processing does not require significant bandwidth, but it is extremely sensitive to latency. Users
who use the cloud to store video or music can tolerate the latency needed to buffer streaming
media, but they demand significantly more bandwidth.
This heterogeneity has led many commentators to recognize that it is not appropriate to
fold cloud computing into the conceptual framework traditionally applied to public utilities
(Brynjolfsson, Hoffman, and Jordan 2010, Kushida, Murray, and Zysman. 2011, Bayrak, Conley,
and Wilkie 2011; also see chapter 3, “Reliability and the Internet Cloud,” in this volume).
History has shown that public utility regulation is ill suited to technologies where the product
attributes are complex and where the production technology varies and is undergoing rapid
technological change (Yoo 2013b). It comes as no surprise, then, that early commentators who
first conceived the computing utility typically acknowledged that it did not fit within the classic
conception of public utilities (see, e.g., Irwin 1966, Parkhill 1966, Baran 1967, Barnett et al.
1967, President’s Task Force on Communications Policy 1968, Smith 1969).
II.

LIMITS OF THE CURRENT ARCHITECTURE

Cloud computing may demand quality of service guarantees, as well as the ability to
control the routes that particular data will pass through the network. The existing architecture
does provide some tools to facilitate the provision of these services. For example, the
8

engineering community has devised a wide range of protocols to help provide defined levels of
quality of service. Indeed, the inclusion of a type-of-service field in the original Internet Protocol
version 4 (IPv4) header reveals that quality of service through prioritization was part of the
Internet’s original design. Subsequently, the Internet community has developed a wide array of
protocols to promote quality of service, including Integrated Services (IntServ), Differentiated
Services (DiffServ), and MultiProtocol Label Switching (MPLS). More recent efforts include
virtual circuit services such as Internet2’s Interoperable On-demand Network (ION) and
deprioritization regimes such as the Low Extra Delay Batch Transport (LEDBAT) from the
Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF), both of which represent fairly substantial deviations
from the principles around which the current Internet is organized (Yoo 2011a). The problem is
that to date, none has attained sufficiently broad acceptance to support cloud services. The
retention of the type-of-service field (renamed “Traffic Class”) in Internet Protocol version 6
(IPv6) underscores the continuing importance of quality of service.
Regarding routing, the original IPv4 header includes an optional field to allow the source
to determine the route that packets will take. This option is not mandatory and has largely been
ignored. In addition, the BGP-based system responsible for routing traffic on the current Internet
employs an algorithm that allows each router to make independent decisions about the path that
particular packets will take through the network. In general, BGP by default simply sends traffic
along the path that transverses the fewest autonomous systems. Although BGP is intended to
permit networks to implement routing policies, these policies tend to be implemented by altering
the routing table by hand by increasing the apparent length of a path in an effort to make certain
routes unattractive. The fact that each firm makes such individualized adjustments on a
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distributed basis can lead to interactions that make such policies difficult to implement and even
harder to guarantee.
Cloud computing providers and users wishing to exercise greater control over the paths
that are taken by traffic that passes between data centers may rely on MPLS or some other
protocol to exercise control over the precise paths that are taken by particular traffic. In fact,
IPv6 added a “Flow Label” field to incorporate this functionality into the network layer itself.
Such control mechanisms are essential to ensuring that flows between data centers maintain the
required levels of quality of service, protect network security, and maintain the privacy of users’
data. As of today, such services are provided as overlays rather than being designed into the
network itself.
Most important in terms of contractibility, even if labels allow users to specify paths
taken through the Internet, the Internet’s architecture does not provide any basis for verifying a
packet’s source or the path that it traversed. Nor is there any basis for verifying whether any
particular prioritization regime was followed. Stated in terms of contract theory, the information
needed to make quality of service and route control contractible is neither observable nor
verifiable.
In addition, with the Internet’s current architecture, the information needed to make
Internet privacy contractible is not observable or verifiable either. First, consider information
about the source of Internet transmissions. One of the foundational principles on which the
Internet is based is that every administrative domain connected to the Internet exchange packets
through a single, uniform spanning layer, represented by the IP, in which each machine is
identified by a unique address that is visible to every other machine connected to the network
(Cerf and Kahn 1974). One problem is that the source address included in the IP header is
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insecure and can be misrepresented (spoofed), making it impossible to verify the source of any
communication under the network’s basic design. Although additional features, such as Internet
Protocol Security (IPSec), have subsequently been developed that can support source
authentication, they are not mandatory and are not widely deployed in IPv4. Although the
specification for Internet Protocol version 6 (IPv6) makes IPSec mandatory, not all IPv6
implementations support IPSec.
Another core principle of the Internet is that routers operating in the network’s core
operate on a store-and-forward basis, with each router making its own independent decision
about the path that any particular packet should take. As a result, users typically cannot specify
the path that a particular packet should take through the network, as the source routing option
included in the Internet’s original design is not mandatory and remains nearly universally
unused. Even if users were able to do this, the localized nature of information on the Internet
makes path information difficult to observe and verify. Any component network of the Internet
can only observe the identity of the network residing immediately upstream and downstream of
its location. The store-and-forward nature of the Internet’s architecture provides no mechanism
through which the user can observe the path actually taken through the network. Thus, even if an
user enters into an SLA with its Internet service provider (ISP) specifying the paths that its traffic
must traverse, it has no reliable way to determine whether the ISP actually honored the terms of
the SLA with respect to a specific transaction. Even if all of the relevant parties were able to
observe the relevant information, the absence of any authoritative record of the path traversed by
any particular packet makes this information difficult, if not impossible, to verify in a court of
law.
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Finally, the architecture restricts the configuration of economic relationships on the
Internet. Money enters the network from the edge, typically as a payment to a last-mile network
provider, but the network architecture provides no flow-based mechanism to allocate it among
the different entities involved in providing service. Simply put, the Internet’s design does not
place the information needed to allocate value in the network layer which, as noted previously, is
the spanning layer visible to all network actors. Restated in terms of contractibility theory, the
economic information needed to support complex contracts is not observable, let alone
verifiable. Or, as MIT computer scientist and former DARPA chief protocol architect David
Clark is reported to have quipped, “We never learned how to route money” (McTaggart 2006).
The absence of any mechanism within the architecture itself for accounting for and
distributing value among different actors forces money to flow through mechanisms that exist
outside the network. Constraining value to flow exclusively through contracts between ISPs
makes ISPs the irreducible unit of economic analysis and reinforces the current hierarchy of
transit providers. Turning ISPs into indivisible artifacts for economic purposes also severely
limits the flexibility with which services can be provided and contracted. Early proposals to
create smart markets that would have permitted the money flow to follow the traffic flow were
never adopted (Mackie-Mason and Varian 1995).
III.

CONTRACTIBILITY AS A POTENTIAL NONREGULATORY SOLUTION

The current network architecture thus restricts the services that the network can provide,
as well as the flexibility with which economic relationships among different network elements
can be configured. The emergence of new phenomena such as the cloud has prompted a wide
range of new research initiatives designed to make the Internet more contractible.
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A.

NEBULA
The need to explore ways that the Internet may need to evolve to respond to new use

cases has led the NSF to launch its Future Internet Architecture (FIA) project. One new
architecture known as NEBULA is specifically designed to support the new demands placed on
the network by cloud computing (Anderson et al. 2013, 2014). The challenge is to strike a
balance between flexibility and efficiency by creating a minimal spanning set of features that can
support an arbitrarily broad set of transit policies. The aspects of the NEBULA design that make
the services on which cloud computing depends contractible are a control plane, known as the
NEBULA Virtual and Extensible Networking Techniques (NVENT), and the NEBULA Data
Plane (NDP), which is being adapted from a technology known as ICING (Naous et al. 2011).
A communication begins when the sending network places a request for a path to
NVENT. NVENT envisions that each administrative domain comprising the Internet will
maintain a policy engine that reciprocally exchanges information with other policy engines about
the available services, resources, and paths. The policy engine identifies paths to reach requested
destinations in ways that comply with any preferred transit policies governing the entities
permitted to constitute the path, bandwidth, latency, reliability, and other considerations. The
path or paths and the associated policies are then embodied in a token in a manner similar to
MPLS. Any noncompliant paths are considered rejected by default. Once a path has been
discovered, NVENT consults a consent engine maintained by each administrative domain and
collects cryptographic proofs of consent from each of the administrative domains comprising the
path. The fact that the policy and consent engines are distributed across the administrative
domains comprising the network facilitates this system’s flexibility and extensibility. It also
provides flexibility in the specific policies being implemented.
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The proofs of consent are then inserted into the NDP, which in effect replaces IP with a
new spanning layer that supports source and path authentication. NDP reserves 42 bytes in its
header (depicted in Figure 4.1) for four elements with respect to each administrative domain
contained in the path constructed by NVENT: (1) the domain identifier; (2) a cryptographic
proof that the domain has authorized being included in the path, called the proof of consent
(PoC); (3) a cryptographic proof that the packet has actually followed that path, called the proof
of provenance (PoP); and (4) the MPLS-style token associated with this path.
Figure 4.1: NDP packet format

counter

other
fields

domain ID

proof of
provenance

proof of
consent

payload

MPLS-style
token

These four elements are sufficient to allow networked entities to both express and enforce
a broad range of policies about packet carriage. Decisions about policies are relegated to the
control plane (NVENT), which remains distributed and flexible. Once those policies are
embodied in the MPLS-style token, the four features embedded in the data plane (NDP)
described previously are sufficient to allow these policies to be enforced. When a packet arrives
at an administrative domain, that domain can check the PoC to verify that the packet was
authorized by the policy. As the packet traverses the domain, the domain attaches its PoP to
verify to all other network participants that it actually traversed that domain. The fact that both
the PoC and PoP are cryptographically protected using public-key encryption allows every entity
to authenticate the accuracy of the information contained therein. An added feature of NDP is
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that the key for decrypting the PoC and PoP is the domain identifier, which obviates the need to
manage keys or maintain certificate authorities.
The four basic primitives contained in NDP are sufficient to encompass the functions
enabled by a wide range of other efforts to make networks more secure. Specifically, NDP can
determine that all communications traverse an assured path, prevent the entry of unauthorized
communications, support the establishment of multiple paths to ensure availability and
reliability, permit each administrative domain to exercise autonomous control, and enhance
privacy by ensuring that communications only traverse trusted providers. In so doing, they
provide a parsimonious set of information that provides the same functions as a wide range of
more complex designs already appearing in the literature. Preliminary experiments and
prototypes indicate that the architecture is feasible (Naous et al. 2010, 2011).
The cryptographically protected PoCs permit each administrative domain to authenticate
that the particular transaction has been authorized ex ante. At the same time, the
cryptographically protected PoPs permit each administrative domain to authenticate ex post that
the approved path was followed.
These innovations have a dramatic impact on contractibility. By making the specific
administrative domains traversed and the policies being applied visible, NEBULA renders the
information needed to enforce privacy observable. In addition, the application of cryptographic
signatures as each packet crosses an administrative domain makes any agreements as to paths to
be used and policies to be honored verifiable.
Like any architecture, NEBULA is not without its potential concerns. As an initial matter,
NDP requires the incurrence of significant overhead. For example, the inclusion in the network
layer of the additional information associated with the four elements described here in the
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network layer header makes packets roughly 20 percent larger. Because NDP’s functions are
parallelizable, it appears that NDP can operate at backbone speeds. NDP-enabled routers would
cost roughly 90 percent more than a bare-bones IP router but slightly less than a commercial IP
router (Naous et al. 2010, 2011). These initial efforts are simply to provide proof of the concept.
As was the case with the Internet itself, additional improvements on operating efficiency are
likely to be realized once the network is refined and deployed. NDP is by no means the only
approach to enhancing contractibility. In fact, NEBULA explored approaches based around
alternative technologies(Anderson et al. 2013).
Although NDP enhances observability and verifiability, a trusted entity may nonetheless
evade its limitations by subcontracting responsibility for transmission to another, unapproved
entity or using tunneling to allow the communication to use unapproved routes. Moreover,
although the information contained in the NDP header is designed to verify the path, it is less
effective at revealing whether other policies were honored. NDP thus may require additional
enforcement mechanisms outside its current design. Because contracting entities may not be in
privity with these other parties, full enforcement may require recognizing a property interest in
private information that is good against enforceable against all parties regardless of whether they
have a contractual relationship.
The preliminary nature of the NEBULA project suggests that it is too soon to expect
definitive answers to each of these issues. All of these considerations are the subject of future
research. Any evaluation of its potential must bear in mind that it is the first implementation of
such an architecture and is put forward as a proof of concept, not as an operational business
model. One can reasonably expect performance improvements should the architecture be fully
deployed.
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B.

IEEE Intercloud
Another research project that would provide the primitives needed to make cloud

connectivity contractible is the IEEE’s Intercloud working group (IEEE 2012, 2013). The
primary goal of the Intercloud initiative is to standardize cloud services. Not only would this
make them more portable; it would allow providers to combine cloud services offered by
different providers and dynamically integrate them into a single offering.
The basic architecture of the Intercloud is modeled on the Internet. The architecture
centers on community-governed Intercloud root providers that serve as the naming authority for
the Intercloud in much the same manner as the domain name system does for the Internet. The
Intercloud root providers also serve as the trust authority for the public key infrastructure (PKI)
used to authenticate each entity. Presumably, the Intercloud root would not be a single entity.
Instead, there would be multiple Intercloud roots that would host the cloud computing resource
catalog in a federated manner.
In addition to performing these functions, the Intercloud root providers offer other
services needed to support contracts for cloud services. Most important, they maintain cloud
computing resource catalogs that make visible the available cloud resources. These
advertisements are made using uniform semantics that describe not only physical resources, such
as servers, disks, and connectivity, but also other less tangible attributes, including SLAs, pricing
policies, and security and compliance policies. It thus provides visibility and access to the
information needed to form contracts through the Intercloud (Bernstein and Vij 2010).
The architecture also envisions the Intercloud exchanges that provide locations where
multiple cloud providers can interoperate in a manner similar to the role currently served by
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Internet exchanges for the Internet. These exchanges draw on the catalog information hosted by
the root providers to broker cloud transactions with users.
The typical transaction falls into the following pattern: Cloud 1 uses its Intercloud
gateway to query the cloud computing resources catalog maintained by the Intercloud root server
to determine if the resources needed to support a particular cloud service are available. If Cloud
1 finds out from the catalog that the resources needed to meet its requirements and constraints
are available from Cloud 2, the Intercloud exchange brokers an agreement between the two
clouds. If an agreement is successfully reached, the clouds bilaterally establish the web sockets
and other protocols needed for Cloud 2 to provide services to Cloud 1. Cloud 1 then uses Cloud
2’s resources as part of its federated architecture, while Cloud 2 meters resource usage and
compliance with the terms of the SLA.
Once this happens, most of the primitives needed for contractibility will be met. The
cloud computing resource catalog makes the necessary resources observable to others prior to
performance. Importantly, this includes not just the physical elements of the cloud, but also the
SLAs, pricing, and other terms needed for contacts to operate. Each cloud conducts its own
metering.
The only thing missing is ex post auditability. The Intercloud’s architects recognize that
an audit trail constitutes an essential part of the architecture. These responsibilities are supposed
to be borne by the Intercloud root servers, although the necessary implementations have not been
designed yet. Deployment of this auditing capability would make these transactions observable
and verifiable during and after performance.
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C.

eXpressive Internet Architecture
Other NSF-sponsored FIA projects are pursuing architectures that enhance contractibility

in different ways. For example, the eXpressive Internet Architecture (XIA) project has developed
an architecture known as Scalability, Control, and Isolation On Next-generation networks
(SCION) that relies more on trust than explicit enforcement (Zhang et al. 2011; Naylor et al.
2014).
SCION envisions that each autonomous system (AS) joins with other ASes to form a
trusted domain (TD) that separates trusted from distrusted entities. Each TD designates an AS to
represent the TD in the TD core, which initiates path construction, disseminates policy-complaint
paths, allows destinations to choose their preferred paths, and uses cryptographic methods to
ensure the authenticity of end-to-end paths.
Once the route has been joined, the source domain embeds “opaque fields” into each
packet that encode the path information. Because SCION does not require each domain to
cryptographically sign each packet as it traverses the domain, this solution does not fully support
verifiability. Instead, SCION relies on trust or some other mechanism outside the information
contained in each packet to authenticate the source and to determine whether the domains
actually honored the selected path.
D.

ChoiceNet
The research program that most explicitly attempts to make Internet-based transactions

contractible is ChoiceNet, which was also funded by the NSF’s FIA program (Wolf et al. 2014).
The current architecture imposes a number of constraints on the network. Money enters the
network only through its edges and flows outside the network architecture. Moreover, traffic is
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constrained to move through the network in accordance with the economic relationships between
network providers implicitly reflected in BGP routing policies. The result is that both users and
content providers have little control over how their traffic is handled within networks.
ChoiceNet is designed to create an “economy plane” that enables actors to create
contracts that dynamically integrate the offerings of multiple providers of network components
into a single service offering. The goal is to allow the money flow to follow the traffic flow
instead of vice versa. The resulting flexibility in configuring services from different providers
should enable new entities to combine the underlying network elements in new ways, which can
promote innovation and competition.
ChoiceNet provides a uniform address architecture and a minimal set of service
semantics sufficient to permit network providers to advertise the nature of the services they are
offering. The semantics must cover not only the physical services being provided, but also other
contractual terms such as quality of service and price. ChoiceNet entities then act as
intermediaries to combine and bundle these services into end-to-end offerings. ChoiceNet then
provides a marketplace where customers can shop for different end-to-end service offerings that
the intermediaries have created. The semantics of the marketplace advertisements must be
general enough to be searchable, yet specific enough to specify the necessary dimensions of
performance. Finally, ChoiceNet envisions a verification process through which customers can
determine whether actual performance lived up to the contract specifications. While ChoiceNet’s
designers are rather vague about the details of how to implement this function, suggesting that it
might be fulfilled by third-party measurement providers or by the exchange of measurement data
within the research community, they have acknowledged that verification plays an indispensable
role in their scheme.
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A ChoiceNet transaction can be envisioned as a five-step process. In the advertisement
step, the intermediary advertises in the marketplace the end-to-end offering that it has created. In
the planning step, prospective customers use algorithms to search the marketplace and explore
the bundles of services created by the intermediaries. In the provisioning step, the customers and
intermediaries establish contracts, exchange consideration, commit the resources to provide the
agreed-upon service, and generate tokens that serve as credentials to obtain access to the
contracted-for resources and to prove policy compliance. In the usage step, each resource
examines the token to verify that usage has been authorized in the economy plane. In the
verification step, the customer employs a verification service to confirm that it received the
promised level of performance.
ChoiceNet was not designed specifically for the cloud, although cloud computing would
be able to employ its architecture to the same extent as other Internet-based applications.
Admittedly, the ChoiceNet architecture is not yet well developed. But the basic approach is fully
consistent with the concerns raised in this chapter. The ChoiceNet architecture is designed to
provide the elements needed for contractibility. Creating semantics and loci for sharing
information about service attributes makes the necessary information observable prior to
performance. The envisioned verification mechanism would make the actual performance both
observable and verifiable.
At this early stage, one must be careful not to become overly distracted by debates over
the relative merits of any particular proposal. The principle of making Internet transmissions
contractible by making key information both observable and verifiable is ultimately more
important than the details of how that is done in any particular implementation.
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CONCLUSION
Cloud computing is creating new demands for network services that the current
architecture was not designed to support. The increasing diversity of new technologies and
applications and the accelerating rate of innovation suggest that direct regulation will continue to
lag behind the current environment and will struggle to scale as use cases continue to proliferate.
A more fruitful approach may be to focus instead on supporting more contract-oriented
governance by making Internet transactions more contractible. Rather than envisioning any
particular type of contractual relationship, this approach revises the network layer visible to all
Internet-connected actors to provide sufficient primitives to permit individual actors to construct
a wide range of interconnection relationships. The resulting ability to authenticate the source of
packets as well as the path they used to traverse the network should greatly enhance Internet
privacy.
Clean-slate redesigns of network architecture are notoriously difficult to implement. The
presence of a large installed base creates significant inertia behind the existing architecture. Such
inertia can be overcome if the new architecture provides sufficient value. Even so, such
transitions are likely to pose significant multilayer coordination problems (Yoo 2013a). The
details of the specific implementation are less important than the need to refocus the privacy
debate away from command-and-control regulation in favor of a more flexible, decentralized,
and evolvable regime that is more consistent with the Internet philosophy and relies primarily on
private ordering.
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